



Digital Security



What's Your Game Plan?

Leveraging Apple's Game Engine
to Detect macOS Threats



About Us



cybersecurity solutions for the macOS enterprise

@digita_security

Objective See Tools++




Monitoring Capability + Built-in Detection Logic = New Tool!

Let's Rethink/Redesign this...

Outline

Today's GamePlan



MonitorKit



macOS monitoring



Game Engine-Based Analysis & Detection




macOS threats

MonitorKit



macOS monitoring framework




MonitorKit

macOS monitoring framework



Swift/Objective-C framework



OpenBSM Parsing

Reading and parsing `/dev/auditpipe`

▶ Get Cozy with OpenBSM Auditing - Patrick Wardle

📖 *OS Internals – Chapter 2: Auditing - Jonathan Levin




Audit Mask Options:

```
AUDIT_CLASS_FILE_READ
AUDIT_CLASS_FILE_WRITE
AUDIT_CLASS_FILE_ATTR_ACCESS
AUDIT_CLASS_FILE_ATTR_MODIFY
AUDIT_CLASS_FILE_CREATE
AUDIT_CLASS_FILE_DELETE
AUDIT_CLASS_FILE_CLOSE
AUDIT_CLASS_PROCESS
AUDIT_CLASS_NETWORK
AUDIT_CLASS_IPC
AUDIT_CLASS_NON_ATTRIB
AUDIT_CLASS_ADMIN
AUDIT_CLASS_LOGIN_LOGOUT
AUDIT_CLASS_AUTH
AUDIT_CLASS_APP
AUDIT_CLASS_IOCTL
AUDIT_CLASS_EXEC
AUDIT_CLASS_MISC
AUDIT_CLASS_ALL
```

→ `au_read_rec`

Audit Record:



Audit Token:

Token `AUT_EXEC_ARGS`:

```
arg      : system_profiler
arg      : -xml
arg      : SPMemoryDataType
```

→ `au_fetch_tok`

Audit Token:

Token `AUT_ATTR32`:

```
mode     : 33261
uid      : 0
gid      : 0
fsid     : 16777223
nid      : 34010260
dev      : 0
```

OpenBSM

Open Source Event Auditing



MonitorKit wraps Process and Auth events to simplify usage

Raw OpenBSM Monitoring:

```
let mask: u_int = AuditConstants.AUDIT_CLASS_PROCESS | AuditConstants.AUDIT_CLASS_EXEC

let filter: [UInt16] = [
  UInt16(AUE_EXEC),
  UInt16(AUE_EXIT),
  UInt16(AUE_FORK),
  UInt16(AUE_EXECVE),
  UInt16(AUE_POSIX_SPAWN)
]

if let monitor = try? BSMMonitor(mask, recordFilter: filter) {
  monitor.start { (record: BSMRecord) in
    for token in record.tokens {
      print("Token \(token.tokenString()):\n \(token.stringValue)")
    }
  }
}
```

Process Monitoring:

```
if let monitor = try? ProcessMonitor() {
  monitor.start { (event: ProcessEvent) in
    if event.type == .CREATE {
      print("Process with pid \(event.pid) created")
    } else if event.type == .EXIT {
      print("Process with pid \(event.pid) exited")
    }
  }
}
```





BSMExplorer



BSMExplorer - Open source application that utilizes MonitorKit to provide GUI for filtering and viewing BSM records.


Type	Time	Process	User	Info
ioctl(2)	09:39:29.0000	BSMExplorer	root	9 Tokens
fcntl(2)	09:39:29.0000	Xcode	jon	6 Tokens
fcntl(2)	09:39:29.0000	Xcode	jon	7 Tokens
fcntl(2)	09:39:29.0000	Xcode	jon	7 Tokens
close(2)	09:39:29.0000	Xcode	jon	7 Tokens
ioctl(2)	09:39:29.0000	BSMExplorer	root	9 Tokens
fcntl(2)	09:39:29.0000	Xcode	jon	6 Tokens
fcntl(2)	09:39:29.0000	Xcode	jon	7 Tokens
munmap(2)	09:39:29.0000	BSMExplorer	root	6 Tokens
munmap(2)	09:39:29.0000	BSMExplorer	root	6 Tokens
taskname_for_pid()	09:39:29.0000	sysmond	root	7 Tokens
mac_syscall(2)	09:39:29.0000	sysmond	root	6 Tokens
task_for_pid()	09:39:29.0000	sysmond	root	7 Tokens
mac_syscall(2)	09:39:29.0000	sysmond	root	6 Tokens
task_for_pid()	09:39:29.0000	sysmond	root	7 Tokens
mac_syscall(2)	09:39:29.0000	sysmond	root	6 Tokens
munmap(2)	09:39:29.0000	BSMExplorer	root	6 Tokens
munmap(2)	09:39:29.0000	BSMExplorer	root	6 Tokens
mac_syscall(2)	09:39:29.0000	sysmond	root	6 Tokens

```
Token AUT_SUBJECT32:
auid      : 501
euid      : 0
egid      : 0
ruid      : 0
rgid      : 0
pid       : 55234
sid       : 100949
tid       : au_tid32(port: 50331650, addr: 0)

Token AUT_RETURN32:
status    : 0
```

FSEvents

Direct Use of `/dev/fsevents`



Apple's FSEvents API does not provide the responsible pid for the file i/o, so direct access (`/dev/fsevents`) is leveraged


```
let monitor = FileMonitorFSE()

public static let filter = [
    FSEventTypes.CREATE_FILE.rawValue,
    FSEventTypes.DELETE.rawValue,
    FSEventTypes.STAT_CHANGED.rawValue,
    FSEventTypes.RENAME.rawValue,
    FSEventTypes.CONTENT_MODIFIED.rawValue,
    FSEventTypes.EXCHANGE.rawValue,
    FSEventTypes.FINDER_INFO_CHANGED.rawValue,
    FSEventTypes.CREATE_DIR.rawValue,
    FSEventTypes.CHOWN.rawValue,
    FSEventTypes.XATTR_MODIFIED.rawValue,
    FSEventTypes.XATTR_REMOVED.rawValue
]

monitor.start(eventFilterInclude: filter) { event in
    print("\(event.pid) \(event.type.string) \(event.path)")
}
```

Spotlight Notifications

Extended Attributes (xattrs) Monitor



Register observers and get notified of user behaviors such as screenshots and downloads

Raw Spotlight Monitoring:

```
@objcMembers public class ScreenshotEvent: NSObject {
    public let timestamp: Date
    public let path: String
}

let predicate = NSPredicate(fromMetadataQueryString: "kMDItemIsScreenCapture = 1")

public class ScreenshotMonitor: BaseSpotlightMonitor<ScreenshotEvent> {
    public init() {
        super.init(
            predicate: predicate,
            forNotification: NSNotification.Name.NSMetadataQueryDidUpdate)
    }
}

monitor.start() { event in
    print("Screenshot \(event.path)")
}
```


Download Monitoring:

```
let monitor = DownloadMonitor()

monitor.start() { event in
    print("Downloaded File \(event.path)")
}
```

CoreGraphics Event Taps

Programatic Input Monitoring



Synthetic Click Monitoring:

```
let monitor = SyntheticClickMonitor()  
  
monitor.start() { event in  
    print("Detectected click from pid \(event.pid)")  
}
```

Monitor more obscure system events such as synthetic/ programatic mouse or keyboard clicks

 The Mouse is Mightier than the Sword - Patrick Wardle

IOKit Notifications

Monitoring for New Hardware



event coverage



event details



resource impact



complexity

Register observers and get notified of new hardware such as USB Devices.

USB Monitoring:

```
let monitor = USBMonitor()

monitor.start() { event in
    print("Detected usb device \ (event.device.serialNumber) ")
}
```


Check out MonitorKit

Future Monitors:



Do Not Disturb laptop open events



Oversight microphone and video camera access events



Keylogger detections



Will be released to our github account (<https://github.com/DigitaSecurity>)




Real Time Analysis

Using Apple's GameplayKit

Goals: Context + Flexible analysis

Adjust and extend detections without core modification

Objective-See @objective_see · May 3
new 🍏-malware, 'OSX/Snake' blog.fox-it.com/2017/05/03/sna... 0 AV detections (VirusTotal), signed ('bypass' Gatekeeper) -BlockBlock detects 🚨
#trend



cp (Apple Code Signing Cert Auth)
process id: 904
process path: /bin/cp

installld.sh (unsigned)
startup file: /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.adobe.update.plist
startup binary: /Library/Scripts/installld.sh

Choose your update option:
 Allow Adobe to install updates (recommended)
 Notify me to install updates
 Never check for updates (not recommended)

1 37 43

Nicolas Dunand @ndunand · May 4
great job from BlockBlock but how am I as a user supposed to know I should click "block"? afaik this could just be some legit Flash update
1

Alex Ionescu @aionescu · Oct 13
Thing you learn after building EDR software that runs on tens of millions of machines worldwide: "XXXX definitely shouldn't be doing YYYY" will always detect APT. And shut down some company's critical servers because they rely on that behavior 🙄

Jessica Payne @jepayneMSFT
Thing w3wp.exe should probably not be doing: launching cmd.exe
Thing w3wp.exe should definitely not be doing: launching cmd.exe to use certutil to download Mimikatz...
Show this thread


8 30 104

!BlackBox and !Rigid. Allow the system to be adjusted, and extended in the enterprise without core modifications or new code.

Provide structured output and configurable logic to allow admins to make better, perhaps automated decisions


Game Logic Engine

the traditional pieces



Analyzing System Events

the scheme



GameplayKit


Apple's Game Engine Framework == logic controller

~~Logic GKRuleSystem~~

"allows a list of [logic blocks], together with context for evaluating them and interpreting results, for use in constructing data-driven logic or fuzzy logic systems"

+


"Separate game design from executable code"



Strategists



Randomization




Components



State Machines



Goals, Behaviors



Pathfinding



Rule Systems

https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Conceptual/GameplayKit_Guide/index.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40015172

GKRuleSystem

A simple example

```
import Foundation
import GameplayKit

class SimpleLogicSystem {
    let system: GKRuleSystem

    init() {
        self.system = GKRuleSystem()

        // Define the game logic
        let hunt = NSPredicate(format: "$invincible == false")
        let retreat = NSPredicate(format: "$invincible == true")

        // Load it into the "rule system"
        self.system.add(GKNSPredicateRule(predicate: hunt, assertingFact: "hunt" as NSObjectProtocol, grade: 1.0))
        self.system.add(GKNSPredicateRule(predicate: retreat, retractingFact: "hunt" as NSObjectProtocol, grade: 1.0))
    }

    // Call update on a timer, or when the event occurs
    func update(powerPellet: Bool) {
        self.system.state["invincible"] = powerPellet
        self.system.reset()
        self.system.evaluate()

        let ghostHunt = self.system.grade(forFact: "hunt" as NSObjectProtocol)
        if ghostHunt > 0.0 {
            print("lets go hunting")
        } else {
            print("run, Forest, run!")
        }
    }
}
```

(1) Define and load the "game" logic

(2) On a timer, or drive-by events, re-evaluate / execute the engine

(3) Respond to the output of the evaluation

```
// Simple example
let sys = SimpleLogicSystem()
sys.update(powerPellet: true)
sys.update(powerPellet: false)
```

```
run, Forest, run!
lets go hunting
|
```

"GamePlans"

Defining predicates across the Mitre ATT&CK Framework

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence  
Privilege Escalation  	Defense Evasion	Credential Access
Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection  
Exfiltration 	Command & Control 	

Developing GamePlans

BlockBlock inspired logic blocks

```
$event.isNewDirectory = 1 AND (  
$event.path MATCHES[cd] "/System/Library/Extensions/[^/]*" OR  
$event.path MATCHES[cd] "/Library/Extensions/[^/]*"  
) → Persist, Kext
```

Logic block is
NSPredicate over
data model



```
... → Persist, Kext  
... → Persist, Launch  
... → Persist, EventMonitor  
... → Persist, AppLoginItem  
... → Persist, LoginItem  
... → Persist, CronJob  
... → Persist, StartupItem  
... → Persist, LoginHook  
... → Persist, SpotlightImporter  
... → Persist, SecurityAgentPlugin  
... → Persist, DYLDInsert(App)  
... & "Launch" → Persist, DYLDInsert(LaunchD)
```


Labels applied
by logic blocks



detecting macOS att&ck persistence techniques

Chaining Logic Blocks

For more accurate and actionable detection



Advanced Behavioral Detections

Ransomwhere? Inspired Detections

File I/O Modification of file in /Users/
+ Process responsible for file modification is not Apple Signed or from App Store
+ File contents now encrypted (Chi Square distribution, Monte Carlo pi approximation,...)
+ Process responsible for file modifications has quickly encrypted several files
= Potential Ransomware



```
$event.isModified = TRUE AND  
$event.path MATCHES[cd] "/Users/*" AND  
!$event.process.labels.contains("AppleSigned", "AppStore") AND  
!$event.contents.encrypted = TRUE
```

UntrustedEncrypt

```
$event.labels.contains("UntrustedEncrypt") AND  
@SUBQUERY(cache, $e, $e.date > (X sec ago) AND  
$e.process.pid = $event.process.pid).@count > 3 → Ransomware
```

Ransomware



+



Real Time
Analysis

VS



macOS threats



Another look at FruitFly

A Better Fly Trap?

A chance for detection on install

```
($event.path MATCHES[cd] "/System/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist" OR  
$event.path MATCHES[cd] "/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist" OR  
$event.path MATCHES[cd] "/Users/*/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist") AND  
$event.isNewFile = 1
```

Generically Detect a Launch Agent being registered

+

```
$event.label.contains("LaunchAgent") AND  
($event.file.contentsAsDict.ProgramArguments)[0].lastPathComponent.startsWith(".")
```

Determine that its a hidden program to be launched

<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/>

<https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2017/VB2017-Wardle.pdf>

FruitFly Launch & Behaviors




If persisting a hidden file isn't enough cause for alarm

```
$event.process.path.lastPathComponent.startsWith(".")
```



A hidden file is being executed



```
$event.process.path.startsWith("/tmp")
```

Then extracts and executes a file out of tmp



```
+ Controls the camera  
+ Issue synthetic clicks  
+ Synthetic keyboard events
```




<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/>

<https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2017/VB2017-Wardle.pdf>

WindShift Execution Vector

Via Phishing, "Safe" Open, CustomURL Handlers, & Redirects



Open "Safe" files: Including PDFs & Archives?!?

macOS parses and auto-registers handlers on write.

windshift:// launches app

```
<key>CFBundleURLTypes</key>
<array>
  <dict>
    <key>CFBundleURLSchemes</key>
    <array>
      <string>windshift</string>
    </array>
    <key>CFBundleURLName</key>
    <string>com.foo.bar.WindShift</string>
  </dict>
</array>
```

Extracted App Info.plist

<https://digitasecurity.com/blog/2018/08/30/windshift/>

<https://gsec.hitb.org/sg2018/sessions/commsec-the-trails-of-windshift-apt/>

Detecting WindShift Execution Vector

Via "Safe" Open & CustomURL Handlers

```
$event.isNewDirectory = 1 AND  
$event.file.isAppBundle = 1 AND  
$event.file.bundle.infoDictionary.CFBundleURLTypes ≠ nil
```

Custom URL Handler

+

```
$event.isNewDirectory = 1 AND  
$event.process.name = 'SAFARI'
```

File automatically written by 'Safari'

or


```
$event.signType ≠ 'Apple' OR  
$event.signType ≠ 'AppStore'
```

Not distributed by Apple or
the App Store

<https://digitasecurity.com/blog/2018/08/30/windshift/>

<https://gsec.hitb.org/sg2018/sessions/commsec-the-trails-of-windshift-apt/>

My Favorite Adware Detector!?




```
$event.process.path.contains("Adobe") OR  
$event.process.path.contains("Flash")
```

Process path contains Adobe or Flash


+

```
$event.process.sigtype = Adhoc OR  
($event.process.sigtype = Dev AND  
$event.process.signer ≠  
"Adobe Systems, Inc.")
```


But not validly signed by Adobe!



=



GamePlan



GamePlan

Purpose built macOS endpoint detection, auditing and threat hunting platform with extensible analytics efficiently executed by a game engine

Generally available for the enterprise in 2019!

Questions and Answers

Contact us anytime!

<https://digitasecurity.com>

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🐦 @joshuahstein

