

The Clock is TCCing

OBTS
V6.0

CALUM
HALL

LUKE
ROBERTS

PHORION

> whoami



Luke Roberts

Phorion

 rookuu_




Calum Hall

Phorion

 _calumhall

Today's Agenda



PART



01

What is TCC?


Transparency, Consent and Control?

An Apple privacy feature that prompts Users to permit applications access to various system resources.


- Camera/Microphone
- Various User Folders
 - Downloads
 - Documents
- System Folders
- Other App Bundles (new)



Under the hood




An attacker's perspective



FULL DISK ACCESS




Ability to edit user's TCC.db
No user interaction required
System TCC.db is SIP protected



EXPLOITATION



We find a TCC bug
A few in this room have experience 🙄
We piggyback a legitimate app
Inherit TCC permissions




ANNOYING APPROACH




Let's just ask... repeatedly!
macOS is a world of unexpected prompts
TCC prompts aren't verbose, it's not overly suspicious to prompt the user

Problem #1



Digging deeper

Take a look at the prompt on the left. What does this *actually* tell you?





This happened to me
Terminal is requesting access to the Microphone... oh no.



Problem #2

TCC is gated by Bundle ID, not version

- Do you remember why you granted an app access back in 2019?
- Vulnerabilities introduced
- Change of application ownership
 - Nightowl a macOS dark mode app
 - Purchased in 2022
 - Turned into adware



Problem #3



Lack of TCC usage information

- No visibility into resource usage
 - Unable to monitor for unexpected resource access
 - Not able to monitor applications for failed access attempts
- Difficult to determine if an application *actually* needs resource permissions

PART


02

Gaining Visibility

Knowledge is power

Helpfully TCCd logs fairly useful messages to the system unified log. Included in here we have;

- What the app was requesting access for?
- The **responsible** process, and **accessing** process.
- The result, whether it was denied or approved and why.



Log diving

1. // REQUEST
2. // AUTHREQ_CTX
3. // AUTHREQ_ATTRIBUTION
4. // AUTHREQ_SUBJECT
5. // AUTHREQ_PROMPTING
6. // AUTHREQ_RESULT

```
// AUTHREQ_ATTRIBUTION:
msgID=150.34,
attribution={
    responsible=
        {<TCCDProcess:
            identifier=com.apple.Terminal,
            pid=136
        }
}

// AUTHREQ_PROMPTING:
msgID=150.34,
service=kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDownloadsFolder,
subject=Sub:{com.apple.Terminal}
Reason:<TCCDProcess:
// AUTHREQ_RESULT:
msgID=150.34,
authValue=0,
authReason=3,
authVersion=1,
error=(null),
    binary_path=/System/Applications/Utilities/
Terminal.app/Contents/MacOS/Terminal
},
    requesting={<TCCDProcess:
        identifier=com.apple.sandboxd,
        pid=150,
        auid=0,
        euid=0,
        binary_path=/usr/libexec/sandboxd
    }
},
},
```

Balancing on a knife edge.

macOS 11

```
accessing={identifier=com.apple.ls, pid=4581, auid=501,
euid=501, binary_path=/bin/ls},
```

macOS 12

```
accessing={<TCCDProcess: identifier=com.apple.ls, pid=4581,
auid=501, euid=501, binary_path=/bin/ls>}
```

macOS 13

```
accessing={TCCDProcess: identifier=com.apple.ls, pid=4581,
auid=501, euid=501, binary_path=/bin/ls},
```

Interfacing with TCC to augment an existing security system has not been easy. The OS does not want to help us.

We're using debug log messages from a private Apple service. These might change format (sad regex), introduce new or remove information or even just remove them entirely.

- Lets provide ourselves with some assurances. We've written a GitHub Actions workflow that matrices CI jobs across macOS versions.
- These Actions check that each log message we rely on exists, and is of the format we expect.


PART



04

Introducing Kronos

Kronos

Designed to enhance the capabilities of TCC

- Improve the verbosity of TCC prompts
- Encourage the principle of least privilege with application access
- Provide historical logging for resource access
- And it's open source! 



Transparency

Permissions

- TTC auth values & auth reasons. i.e. user permitted, system set
- Permission last modified
- Signing information

App	Permission	Auth value	Auth reason	Last modified
com.apple.Maps	kTCCServiceLiverpool	2	4	2022-05-31 18:34:01
	kTCCServiceUbiquity	2	4	2022-05-31 18:34:02
Keynote	kTCCServiceUbiquity	2	4	2023-10-08 08:16:44
	kTCCServiceLiverpool	2	4	2023-10-08 08:16:49
	kTCCServiceAddressBook	2	2	2023-10-08 08:17:15

Usage


- What does my app do with it's permissions?
- Historical resource access data
- Responsible and accessing process/path
- Resource access result, i.e. allowed/denied

Timestamp	TCC Permission	Accessing Identifier	Accessing Path	Access Result
2023-10-11 14:47:30	kTCCServiceListenEvent			1
2023-10-11 14:47:31	kTCCServiceListenEvent	com.google.Chrome.helper.plugin	/Applications/Google Chrom...	1
2023-10-11 15:24:29	kTCCServiceListenEvent			1
2023-10-11 15:24:30	kTCCServiceListenEvent	com.google.Chrome.helper.plugin	/Applications/Google Chrom...	1
2023-10-11 15:33:20	kTCCServiceListenEvent			1
2023-10-11 15:33:20	kTCCServiceListenEvent	com.google.Chrome.helper.plugin	/Applications/Google Chrom...	1
2023-10-11 20:55:05	kTCCServiceListenEvent			1
2023-10-11 20:55:05	kTCCServiceListenEvent	com.google.Chrome.helper.plugin	/Applications/Google Chrom...	1
2023-10-11 21:26:11	kTCCServiceListenEvent			1
2023-10-11 21:26:12	kTCCServiceListenEvent	com.google.Chrome.helper.plugin	/Applications/Google Chrom...	1
2023-10-11 22:06:50	kTCCServiceListenEvent			1
2023-10-11 22:06:50	kTCCServiceListenEvent	com.google.Chrome.helper.plugin	/Applications/Google Chrom...	1

Revoking permissions

Avoid indefinite permissions


- **JIT access** for TCC permissions
 - Short term permissions for rare actions
 - Long term permission grants to allow for periodic decisions as to the requirement for app access




Protecting the user's TCC.db

Endpoint Security Framework

- Monitor for direct file writes to the TCC.db
- Notify the user on potentially malicious tampering
- TCC.db integrity for personal use



Next Steps





github.com/PhorionTech/Kronos